The exclusivity of the power of federal public relations has long been affirmed by the Supreme Court. In 1840, for example, the Court declared that one of the main purposes of the Constitution was to make us a people and a nation, insofar as it considered our external relations; 14FootnoteHolmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 pp.) 540, 575-76 (1840). See also USA v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (U.S. external powers must be exercised without regard to state laws or directives. Respect for our external relations in general, the borders of the state disappear; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (For local interests exist the various states of the Union exist; but for national purposes that encompass our relations with foreign nations, we are one people, one nation, one power); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 63 (1941) (Our system of government requires that federal power in this area, which concerns foreign relations, be left completely free of local interference). One hundred years later, the Court of Justice has remained with regard to exclusive federal exclusivity. No state can rewrite our foreign policy to adapt to its own domestic policy. Power over foreign affairs is not shared by states; it is entrusted exclusively to the national government. It is not necessary to exercise it in such a way that it is consistent with state laws or state policy, whether translated into constitutions, statutes or judicial decrees. And state policy becomes totally irrelevant to judicial investigation if the United States, which acts within its constitutional domain, seeks to enforce its foreign policy in court.15FootnoteUnited States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1942).
Chief Justice Stone and Justice Roberts objected. First of all, it was the view of most judges and scholars, that executive agreements, based solely on presidential power, did not become the “law of the land” under the supremacy clause, because these agreements are not “treaties” ratified by the Senate.490 However, the Supreme Court found another basis for compliance with state laws that are anticipated by executive agreements and ultimately relied upon itself on the exercise of the power of the Constitution over the power of external relations within the national government. Ass`v. Garamendi.497 Assuming that the Victim Insurance Relief Act in California was anticipated as interference with the federal government`s conduct in foreign relations, as required by the executive agreements, the court stated that “valid executive agreements are likely to anticipate state law, as are treaties.” 498 Preventive implementation of executive agreements is the result of “the constitutional allocation of foreign policy power to the national government.” 499 As there was a “clear conflict” between California law and policy, 500 However, it was not until 1968 that the Court applied the general principle of invalidating a state law because it violated the country`s outside interests. without an established federal policy. In Zschernig v. Miller16Footnote389 U.S. 429 (1968).
The Court repealed an Oregon-Escheat law that prevented citizens of communist countries from inheriting. The law conditioned the inheritance by non-resident aliens on a statement that U.S. citizens can inherit rebates in the foreign country and that foreign inheritance could receive payments from the Oregon estate without being seized.17FootnoteIn Clark v.M. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), had granted a simple requirement of reciprocity that did not go beyond the additional forfeiture requirement. Although a letter from Amicus from the Department of Justice stated that the application of The Oregon Law in this case alone would not lead to disagreement over U.S. behavior in foreign relations, the Court saw a persistent and subtle impact on international relations arising from the notorious practice of state succession.